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Reservation for Rights of Way for Canals and Ditches in Favor of United
States Over Former Public Lands of the United States
West of the 100th Meridian
By CHARLES . BEISE*
On October 2, 1888,' Federal funds were appropriated for the
survey of western lands for reservoirs, ditches, and canals and all sites
were reserved from entry and sale. As a result of the Attorney General's
ruling of May 27, 1890, that no land west of the 100th meridian could
be entered until such survey was made, Congress determined to repeal
that portion of the act,2 and the surviving portion of the 1888 Act,
together with the 1890 Act are codified today as 43 U. S. C. 662, 43
U. S. C. 945. However, it still retains the following provision:
That in all patents for lands hereafter taken up under any
of the land laws of the United States or on entries or claims vali-
dated by this act, west of the one hundredth meridian, it shall be
expressed that there is reserved from the lands in said patent de-
scribed a right of way thereon for ditches or canals constructed by
the authority of the United States.
The provision granting a free canal right of way to Uncle Sam has been
extensively utilized in the past and will be increasingly used in the
future as the trend of reclamation projects swings from creation of a
primary water supply for raw public lands, to development of supple-
mental waters for existing irrigated areas.3
All those lands taken up under any of the public land laws of the
United States subsequent to October 2, 1888, are subject to rights of
way for ditches or canals constructed by authority of the United States,4
and since a large proportion of western lands have been entered after that
date the reservation accordingly affects a vast acreage west of the 1 00th
meridian in private ownership.
*Of the Denver bar.
125 Stat., 505.
'Act of August 30, 1890, 26 Stat., 371.
'By far the greater number of irrigation projects now investigated by the Bureau
of Reclamation for post-war construction concern themselves with "firming up" present
hazardous irrigation water supplies. Municipal water demands likewise call for con-
struction work in settled areas. The same is true of hydro-electric developments. Neces-
sarily more and more people will be affected by the exercise of this canal right reserved
to the United States.
'General Land Office circular of July 25, 1903.
DICTA
The practitioner's acquaintance with the 1890 Act ordinarily arises
when his client presents him with a notice issued by the Bureau of Rec-
lamation which is customarily mailed out by registered mail. s There is
nothing in the act which limits its exercise to the Bureau of Reclamation
and it is possible that the Department of Agriculture, th United States
Indian Service, the Grazing Service or the Fish and Wildlife Service
might have some projects under which these rights can be claimed. 6 On
January 27, 1943, the Assistant Secretary of the Interior approved a
decision by the Solicitor of that Department whereby it was held that
Indian Reservations created subsequent to October 2, 1888, are subject
to this right of way in favor of the United States, and on August 9,
1943, the Assistant Secretary of the Interior approved his Solicitor's
opinion that the right of way reserved by the Act of August 30, 1890
(26 Stat. 391) may be used to convey water for domestic purposes to
National Parks and Monuments.
The first decisions to arise under the act presented the contention
of the landowner that the reservation in favor of the United States was
limited to existing canals at the time of the passage of the act and that
'The right of way notice is in the following form:
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Bureau of Reclamation
...................... .................... Irrigatio n P ro ject
RIGHT OF WAY NOTICE
..........................................................
- -- - (Date)
It is understood that you have an interest in the land described as -----------------------
Section ------------. T ------------ R ..... ... M ............ and that the United States has an
interest in the same land because it was entered after October 2, 1888, and is accord-
ingly subject to the following provision of law:
"That in all patents for lands hereafter taken up under any of the land
laws of the United States or on entries or claims validated by this act west of
the one hundredth meridian, it shall be expressed that there is reserved from
the lands in said patent described a right of way thereon for ditches or canals
constructed by the authority of the United States." (Act of Aug. 30, 1890,
26 Stat., 391.)
Under the Act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat., 388), and related enactments the
United States is advancing large sums of money for irrigation work in the West, creat-
ing much larger values in the lands benefited.. Operations have reached the point where
such work calls for the use of the right of way reserved to the United States across the
land described above. The purpose of this letter is to notify you and any others inter-
ested in the land that the United States is about to utilize its right of way across the
land. If desired, the project office will be glad to answer questions or give more definite
information concerning the location of the proposed ditch or canal, etc.
Very respectfully,
Project Superintendent.
No statutory requirement of mailing or giving this notice exists. It is a matter
of policy, however, to mail it.
'There are no decisions of courts, of the Land Department, or administrative rul-
ings extant where any other agency other than the Bureau of Reclamation is involved.
See also note 40, and last quotation in this article.
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prospective or future canals were without the scope of the legislation."
The court determined that the legislation was applicable to canals to be
constructed by the government in the future, saying:
As at that time it (United States) had no ditches or canals
Congress must and could have referred only to those it intended to
construct.
The same decision in the state court" gives an excellent summary
of the legislative history of the act and apparently there was a substantial
difference of opinion in Congress concerning the act at the time of the
passage thereof, for Senator Reagan, in speaking of the reservation in
patents to be issued in the future, states:
However much may be said about the House of Representa-
tives in resisting that, they, in my judgment, are entitled to the
profound gratitude of the American people for saving to them the
little that they have saved in this conference report.
And Senator Dolph said:
This provision, while it will be of no practical value to any-
one, will be a cloud or encumbrance on every man's title who se-
cures a portion of the public domain.
This decision likewise held that the language, "constructed by the
authority of the United States," in said act, was applicable without
reference to time of construction and that future construction was in-
cluded within the scope of the act. The ruling in the Green v. Willhite
decision was affirmed again in United States v. Ide, Wyoming, 277 Fed.
373, and affirmed in 68 L. Ed. 407, so that today it has been conclu-
sively established that the reservation was made for the benefit of future
as well as past construction and includes ditches constructed after patent
has issued as well as ditches constructed prior to issuance of patent.
It was next contended in a decision arising in Colorado,9 in con-
nection with the Uncompahgre Project, that the reservation in the 1890
Act was void because of an indefinite description and this contention also
was rejected by the court and the officials of the United States were held
to be authorized by the act to determine the route of the canal. 10
It is a well known fact that where irrigation is practiced exten-
sively, the need for drainage commonly arises, and the United States
in connection with an irrigation project which required drainage claimed
that the reservation in the 1890 Act was applicable to drainage ditches; 1'
the drainage waters collected by the ditches were to be delivered to land
privately owned and outside of the boundaries of the federal project.
'Green v. Willhite, Ida. 1906, 160 Fed. 755.
'Green v. Willhite, Ida. 1908, 93 P. 971.
'U. S. v. Van Horn, 197 Fed. 611, Colo. 1912.
"See note 26 as to reasonableness of choice of route.
'Griffiths v. Cole, Ida. 264 Fed. 369.
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The court determined that drainage ditches were included within the
meaning of the act, stating:
putting it in another way, the proposed disposition of the water
is incidental to the construction and maintenance of the Boise
Project, and, therefore, the proposed canal is within the scope of
the authority conferred by law and for it the Government may
occupy rights of way under the Act of August 30, 1890, or exap-
propriate them by suitable condemnation proceedings.
This conclusion was subsequently affirmed in the United States v. Ide,
supra. This liberal construction of the act has been applied by courts to
the same type of legislation under other acts dealing with irrigation de-
velopment and right of way for canals and ditches for private com-
panies.
12
The statutory right of way reserved by this Act of 1890 in favor
of the United States includes the power to straighten, widen or deepen
a natural ravine or draw to be used in the conveyance of water,12 and this
decision states that the patentees are estopped by acceptance of patent to
qtestion propriety of reservation being inserted therein. This does not
preclude the patentee from challenging the necessity of exercising the
reserved rights nor the reasonableness of the route chosen for these issues
were raised in a decision in Colorado1 4 and the court reserved judgment
upon these points until the case was finally disposed of on its merits,
indicating that the court, at least, considered the objections of the land-
owner. In the Ide decision, the court stated that the right in favor of the
United States must be exercised with ordinary care, otherwise damages
can be recovered, and concerning the issue of the necessity of exercising
the right, the court heard evidence and determined that the changes
sought to be made by the United States were in fact necessary. The mere
fact that the court heard evidence upon the issue indicates that the neces-
sity of exercising the right was considered a proper issue.
15
Where a canal has been constructed by the United States under the
authority of this act and the canal is crossed by a railroad or other im-
provement, such crossings must be made without expense or loss to the
United States and any increased cost of maintenance of canals caused
thereby must be borne by the person crossing the same. 17
"2See Section 18, Act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1101, 43 U. S. C. 946) and
U. S. v. Big Horn Land and Cattle Company, 17 Fed. 2d 357. holding that the
words "canal" or "ditch" were used in an inclusive sense and embrace the entire project.
This holding was affirmed in Twin Falls Canal Company v. American Falls Reservoir
District No. 2, 59 Fed. 2d 19. Johnson Irrigation Company v. Ivory, 24 P. 2d 1053;
U. S. v. Tujungha Co., 48 Fed. 2d 689.
'Ide v. U. S.. Wyo., 277 Fed. 373, affd. 68 L. Ed. 407.
"United States v. Van Horn, Colo. 1912, 197 F. 611.
'See notes 30 and 31.
'7U. S. v. Minidoka and S. W. Railroad Company, 176 Fed. 762, Aff. 59 L. Ed.
200.
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It has been the policy of the Bureau of Reclamation to interpret
the words "ditches" or "canals" to include any form of conveyance of
water, such as siphon, penstock, tunnel, drain, flume or conduit, in addi-
tion to open ditches and canals and there is ample justification for this
interpretation. Thus in Sefton v. Prentice,1s the term "conduit" as
defined by Webster was accepted by the court to mean, "a general word
which applies to any channel or structure by which flowing water can
be coanducted from one point to another. It includes a ditch, flume, pipe
or any kind of aqueduct," and in Colorado,'" Section 7 of Article 16 of
the State Constitution provides, "All persons and corporations shall
have the right of way across public, private and corporation lands for
the construction of ditches, canals and flumes for the purpose of convey-
ing water * * *," and the court stated, concerning the condemnation of
a right of way for a pipe line:
It does not mention a pipe line but its evident object was
to permit a right of way for a conduit through which to convey
water for the purposes designated and hence the kind of conduit
employed and utilized is of no material moment so far as any
question in the case at bar is involved.
And in Washington,20 Section 16 of Article 1 of the Constitution pro-
vided that private property shall not be taken except "for drains, flumes
or ditches on or across the land of others for agriculture * * * purposes,"
and the court decided that the condemnation of a right of way for a
private pipeline was a public use and never mentions the fact that a
pipeline is being built; apparently it was assumed by all the parties in-
volved to be beyond question. Recently in Colorado 21 in an action to
condemn a right of way for a pipeline across a placer claim, the court
affirmed its earlier decision in the Lyons case by stating, "the provisions
quoted above (Section 7, Article 16, Colorado Constitution) cover pipe
lines."
In an article in the Reclamation Era, 22 D. G. Tyree, attorney for
the bureau, concludes with the words, "ditches and canals include a tun-
nel," quoting Webster's definition of a "tunnel" as "a subterraneous
passage way, especially one horizontal and open at both ends, as for a
railroad, canal, drain, etc.," and the author concludes:
If a tunnel is correctly defined as a passageway for a canal,
it is evident that a canal may be an underground waterway as well
"37 P. 641, Calif. 1894.
'Town of Lyons v. City of Longmont, 129 P. 198. 1913.eState v. Superior Court, 266 P. 198.
'Pine Martin Mining Company v. Empire Zinc Co., Colo. 1932, 11 P. 221.
"25 Reclamation Era, 246.
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as an open ditch and that the right of way for a tunnel is, in fact,
right of way for a canal.
23
The Federal Government has been consistent in a liberal interpre-
tatioft of the words "ditches" and "canals," not only when it sought to
exercise a right existing in favor of the United States, but also when a
private party sought to exercise such a right across federal lands. In a
decision arising in Colorado2 4 the applicant sought a right of way for a
pipeline under the Act of March 3, 1891, which granted to private
parties rights of way for "ditches, canals or reservoirs," which request
was refused and on appeal the decision was reversed, stating:
From the foregoing authorities, it appears that the words
"canal" or "ditch" are used to designate any artificial waterway for
irrigation * * * the methods used for conveying water * * * to
the lands to be irrigated vary according to topography of the coun-
try, character of the soil, climate, permanency of the works, etc.
The purpose for which the conduit is constructed and the water
conveyed will largely control the descriptive term used and is very
material in cases arising before this Department in connection with
applications for rights of way under the several laws governing the
granting of such easements or licenses. That purpose is irrigation
and the fact that the words "reservoir, canal, and lateral" are used
in the act does not warrant the assumption that it refers to and
only authorizes the use of the rights of way granted for open canals
or laterals. On the contrary, it is the evident purpose of Congress
to grant the necessary rights of way through public lands for any
and all structures essential or necessary to the accomplishment of
the purpose of irrigation.
There are numerous states which have statutes granting to the
United States a right of way for ditches and canals across state lands and
the validity of these statutes have been challenged and sustained. 2  The
status of these statutes in Colorado is a bit uncertain3
s
'The Bureau of Reclamation has interpreted the 1890 Act to cover pipe lines,
whether above the ground or buried, including penst~cks to power plants.
'Fraser Sources Irrigation and Power Company, 43 Decisions Public Lands, 110.
'United States v. Fuiler, Ida. 1937, 20 Fed. Supp. 839.
'The present statute is found in 4 C. S. A. Chap. 134, Par. 81, and Sec. 29 of
Chap. 187 of the 1919 Session Laws, Page 651, repeals the Acts of 1905 and 1917.
but does not mention Chap. 207 of the Session Laws of 1909, which act resembles the
first statute quoted, save that attached to it was the following language:
"The right of way is hereby given -* * * to the United States to locate,
construct and maintain such roads, bridges, canals, ditches, tunnels, pipelines.
telephone and transmission lines as may be constructed for the purpose of irri-
gation by authority of the United States over and through any of the lands
which are now or may be the property of the State. All conveyances of State
lands hereafter shall contain a reservation of such rights of way,"
and it would therefore seem that the sentence last quoted from the 1909 Act is still in
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Although the United States has reserved the right for canals in
patents to lands issued by it, it has not exercised its right oppressively
and it has made it a policy to pay for all improvements injured or dam-
aged by reason of the construction of the canal. This is not required by
the law. The ordinary procedure is to appraise all improvements on the
lands and to offer the landowner a sum of money which will compensate
him for the damages sustained. Thus it has been held3 2 that a contract
between employees of the Bureau of Reclamation and a contractor con-
structing a canal for the bureau whereby the government would assume
one-half of the cost of removing an electrical transmission line con-
structed upon lands subject to the Act of 1890 was not binding upon
the United States because the reservation in the patent under the Act of
1890 constituted a conveyance running with the land of which the
Power Company had notice and therefore the company could not obtain
a right of way superior to that of the United States, and, accordingly.
there is no authority for the payment from public funds for a right of
way which the United States possesses. This decision was overruled, or
at least since issuance thereof, it has been consistently distinguished.
Thus, it has been held that a landowner is entitled to damages sustained
by him through the exercise of the 1890 canal right by the United
States" as to any improvements owned by him, but not as to his land.
3 4
Compensation has likewise been paid by the United States for any
materials removed in the construction of the canal and utilized by the
United States in construction of some feature of the project off of the
right of way where found; 3r' likewise, where a project has been con-
structed for a mixed purpose, i. e., irrigation and flood control, and a
canal was built for irrigation purposes and also levees several hundred
feet on each side of the canal, compensation has been paid for the addi-
effect. No litigation on this point exists in Colorado. Other statutes for cooperation
with the United States will be found in Vol. 2 C. S. A. Chap. 134, Sections 68, 69.
See also the Ide decision (supra).
'7 Comp. Gen. 217. "Reclamation Service-Rights of Way."
13Albert W. C. Smith, 47 Public Lands Decisions 158, 1919.
*"The rights of the owner of an easement are paramount to the extent of the grant
or reservation to those of the owner of the soil. An easement gives to the owner thereof
all such rights as are incident or necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the
easement. Where the easement is not specifically defined, the rule is that it need be only
such as is reasonably necessary and convenient for the purpose for which it was created.
A grant or reservation of an easement in general terms is limited to a use such as is
reasonably necessary and convenient, and as little burdensome to the servient estate as
possible for the use contemplated. In other words, an unlimited conveyance of an ease-
ment is in law a grant of unlimited reasonable use. Under the above principles, it is
clear that the United States, under the reservation of the right of way contained in the
Act of August 30, 1890, has the right to use such portion of the tract entered as is
necessary for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the lateral. The United
States is not liable for damages resulting to land 'because it did that which it had a
right to do'."
'Reclamation decision July 26, 1913.
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tional area occupied by the levees and not needed for the canal, the
Comptroller General stating:"
The Act of August 30, 1890, does not specify for what
purposes the ditches and canals to be constructed by the United
States are to be used. The history of the act, however, clearly indi-
cates that it had reference to ditches or canals to convey water for
the reclamation of arid lands by irrigation. To the extent there-
fore that the proposed project is for irrigation purposes alone the
title to right of way is already vested in the United States and no
payment may be made for the lands required therefor * * * for
the additional area required for flood control purposes payment
may be made at a reasonable price not in excess of the appraised
value of the land involved.
7
Denver, Air Center of the World
BY STEADHAM ACKER
Following is a summary of remarks made by Mr. Acker, aviation
consultant for Denver, at the March 4, 1946, meeting of the Denver Bar
Association:
Aviation is transportation. It is past the stage where it is a thrill.
It is a business, in its infancy and rapidly developing. It is the newest
form of transportation, which means new markets and new thinkirng.
It has romance, which makes it more interesting as a business.
The atomic bomb will make people in large cities think of decen-
tralization and decentralization will make more transportation.
Air transportation will connect Denver with all the rest of the
world. In a few months Denver will be less than sixty hours by air from
every major city in the world.
How will air transportation help the lawyer? It will help the law-
yer generally as it adds to the development of the city. The prosperity
of a city depends upon its transportation. No transportation means no
communication, which means no business. Air transportation will help
the community in proportion to its use. Denver depends more than any
other city on air transportation. It has obstacles of terrain which it is
overcoming and it has a future of greatness in air transportation. If
Denver becomes prosperous, its citizens will become prosperous and the
lawyer will participate in the city's prosperity. Therefore, the lawyer
will encourage air transportation so as to add to the general prosperity
of the city.
'17 Comp. Gen. 1039. "Real Estate-Rights of Way-Rio Grande Canaliza-
tion Project." .3MAll decisions, administrative rulings and articles extant to September, 1944, are
cited herein.
